This study uses For Official Use Only data on U.S. military operations to evaluate the large-scale Army policies to replace relatively light Type 1 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs) with more heavily protected Type 2 variants and later to replace Type 2s with more heavily protected Type 3s. We find that Type 2 TWVs reduced fatalities at $1.1 million to $24.6 million per life saved, with our preferred cost estimates falling below the $7.5 million cost-effectiveness threshold, and did not reduce fatalities for administrative and support units. We find that replacing Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs did not appreciably reduce fatalities and was not cost-effective.
Global War on Terror took place in two overseas theaters, which we refer to using the generic titles of Theaters A and B. The battalions used in this study all serve in Theater A and constitute a roughly 20% sample of U.S. Army battalions in that theater over those 71 months. To meet these conditions for public release, many of the sources used for the data and institutional details in this paper are excluded from the references list. A full version of the paper with names and descriptions of the vehicles, dates, and a complete set of references has been released internally by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as a Technical Report. That file is FOUO and has been approved for circulation to DoD employees (Rohlfs and Sullivan, 2011) . As the source data are FOUO, they can only be requested from the originating agencies by DoD employees or contractors for government purposes.
The main estimation equations in this paper are ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects regressions that express a unit's deaths in a given month as a function of its stocks of different vehicle types. We examine different sets of control variables, among them troop characteristics, fixed effects for month, province, and unit, province by month interaction effects, and unit-specific trends. The unit-level controls allow us to adjust for intrinsic differences between early and late receivers of the more protected vehicles. The province-by-month effects allow us to adjust for changes in the combat environment that may have influenced the allocation of the new vehicles across geographical areas. We also measure the effects of the phase-in policies on unit-level injuries and on the usage of different types of vehicles.
Our estimates are presented separately for four types of units: infantry, armored and cavalry, administrative and support, and other. For infantry units, we find that replacing a Type 1 with a Type 2 TWV reduced fatalities by 0.04 to 0.43 per month at $1.1 million to $24.6 million per life saved. Our preferred cost per life saved estimates are on the low end of this range and fall below commonly cited estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) of $7.5 million (Holt, 2004; Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008; Viscusi, 1993) , indicating that replacing Type 1 with Type 2 TWVs was cost-effective for these units. Despite the Type 3 TWV's higher cost and the heavier armor, we find little difference in the effects on fatalities between the Type 3 and Type 2 TWVs, and replacing Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs does not appear to have been costeffective. Relative to the effects for infantry units, we find slightly smaller effects of the policies on fatalities for units in the "other" category and little or no effects for administrative and support units. We find that replacing Type 1 TWVs with Type 2 or Type 3 TWVs caused armored and cavalry units to substitute away from heavier vehicles such as tracked vehicles, thus increasing fatalities for those units.
The estimates presented here measure the full reduced-form effects of changing vehicle type, taking into account the intrinsic properties of the vehicles and any behavioral responses by the units. While reducing fatalities was the primary aim of the policies, our estimates should be interpreted with the caveat that they do not capture other potential benefits, such as increasing mission success or reducing the number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. If we suppose that Type 2 TWVs were more effective or deterred more IED attacks than Type 1 TWVs and Type 3 TWVs more than Type 2 TWVs, then both policies were probably more costeffective than our estimates suggest. Additionally, Type 3 TWVs were introduced into Theater A during a relatively safe period. We find very suggestive evidence that Type 3 TWVs would have been cost-effective had they been introduced during a more combat-intensive period of operations.
II. Data and Descriptive Results

A. Data Sources
The unit-level unbalanced monthly panel data used in this study measure a sample of U.S. Army battalions in Theater A over the course of a 71-month time frame. The original data are measured at the company level (six-digit Unit Identification Code, UIC) and are aggregated to the battalion level (four-digit UIC) so that the level of observation matches up most closely with the ways in which vehicles and tasks were assigned. All sources used here are FOUO unless noted otherwise; additional details are in the appendix.
Vehicle Quantities
Data on different units' vehicle holdings and usage come from the Theater A portion of AMSAA's Sample Data Collection (SDC, U.S. AMSAA, 2010) . The SDC tracks a range of tactical and non-tactical ground vehicle systems and includes each vehicle's serial number, mileage, and unit affiliation. The data measure a representative sample of roughly one fifth of U.S. Army units in Theater A, and roughly one third of a typical sampled unit's TWVs appear in the data. The fraction of a unit's vehicles that were sampled is not observed and varies across units due to cooperativeness with the study, activity level, and distance from the data collectors' base of operations in Theater A's capital city (Horsley, 2010) . The within-unit fraction of vehicles sampled appears to have been constant over time. 4 To estimate the numbers of vehicles of each type in each unit, we assume that the sampling fraction for each vehicle type is constant across units and over time. We estimate these 4 Active units were less able to accommodate the data collectors; however, the researchers' worked to ensure that usage and maintenance rates were similar between the SDC and the entire Army in Theater A. With the exception of the vehicle phase-in policies, the exact set of vehicles in the data (as identified by their serial numbers) within a unit is fairly stable, and it is rare for a specific vehicle to drop out of the sample and reappear in a later month. Such cases account for 2.5% of vehicle months, and adding them to the totals has little effect on our estimates. Some vehicle types were dropped from the set of tracked systems when miles driven for those systems were zero for the entire dataset for a few months; hence, unused vehicles tend to be excluded from the unit-level totals. Beginning midway through the sample period, all Type 1 TWVs were dropped for this reason (Simberg, 2007 (Simberg, , 2010b 
Fatalities and Injuries
Unit casualties are measured using data requested from the U.S. Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC, 2010a) that include date, city and country, type of casualty (e.g., KIA), unit, and pay grade for all combat and non-combat deaths and combat injuries to U.S. military personnel over the sample period. Of the roughly 24,000 casualties incurred by U.S. Army units in Theater A over this period, 7.8% were Killed in Action (KIA), 2.5% were non-combat deaths, and the remainder were non-fatal injuries.
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One key descriptive variable that we obtain from the casualty data is unit location. Using
Google Earth and ArcGIS, we determine the geographic coordinates of the casualty city for 81.9% of the U.S. Army casualties in Theater A and identify which of the 18 provinces in Theater A contains each coordinate pair. We assume that a unit's location is the province in which it incurred the most casualties that month. If a unit incurred no casualties with identifiable locations in that month, we use the closest month (before or afterwards) with available data. In 22% of cases, we were not able to identify the unit's location through this procedure. These observations are kept in the data with province equal to a nineteenth "unknown" category.
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Unit Characteristics
Additional data requested from DMDC (2008 DMDC ( , 2010b include the number of troops, the fraction that are officers, Private or Private First Class (PFC), high school graduates, male, black, and Hispanic, average days of deployment experience and age by unit and month, the unit's name, and its home state within the U.S. Using the name, we divide units into infantry, armored 6 One death and seven non-fatal injuries are omitted from the last month of data. 7 Dropping the 823 unit months with unknown locations has little effect on our estimates. and cavalry, administrative and support, and other (including artillery, engineers, military police, and ordnance) based on the main set of tasks that each unit performs. The unit types that were used the most in combat were infantry, armored and cavalry units, with infantry patrolling more by foot and in TWVs and armored and cavalry making greater use of heavier vehicles such as tracked vehicles (About.com, 2010 , U.S. Army, 2010; The U.S. Army Info Site, 2010).
For cases in which unit characteristics were missing for a given unit month but available for that unit for another month, we use the unit's characteristics for the nearest month (looking up to twenty months backward and forward). Of the 4,403 unit months describing 522 units in the SDC, data are imputed in this way for 141 cases describing 56 units, with nearly all of the imputed cases taken from the previous month. Another 730 cases describing 102 units are dropped from the sample due to missing unit characteristics data. These dropped units were not active in combat and the entire set experienced only two combat injuries and zero deaths over the sample period. The remaining sample includes 3,673 observations from 424 different units.
B. Descriptive Results
Theater-wide Patterns
The theater-wide counts of Army TWVs from months one to 71 are plotted in panel A of Figure 1 . The white area shows the total number of the Army's Type 1 TWVs in Theater A, the solid gray area shows Type 2 TWVs, and the black area shows Type 3 TWVs. Panel B of Figure   2 shows the numbers of U.S. troops in Theater A by quarter for the Army and other military branches. As panel A shows, in the first month of the theater-wide data, the total number of 8 Troop characteristics are missing for these observations because no troops from those units were found in the DMDC's personnel file. For specifications that exclude the unit characteristics as controls, keeping these 730 observations in the data leads to substantially smaller fatality-reducing effects of both policies for infantry and "other" units, presumably because the omitted units are small and rarely engaged in combat. Dropping the 28 cases in which troops are less than 10 does not affect the results from this study.
Army TWVs in Theater A was 18,600, of which 5,700 were Type 2. The total number of U.S. While the numbers of these vehicles did not drop to exactly zero, by this time, use of the remaining vehicles of these types only occurred on bases (Simberg, 2010b Panel E of Figure 1 shows total U.S. Army casualties in Theater A by month over the entire war. The black area shows KIA, the gray area shows deaths other than KIA (deaths of wounds, deaths while captured or missing, and non-combat deaths), and the white area shows combat-related injuries. The Army incurred 34 deaths and 266 combat-related injuries in Theater A in the average month. The standard deviation in deaths across months is 23, the standard deviation in combat-related injuries is 166, and total Army casualties in Theater A often changed by more than 100 from one month to the next. Some of these changes are attributable to U.S.-led actions, such as the tactical decision to increase U.S. troop levels around month 32.;
however, many are attributable to changes in insurgent activity and the numbers of IED attacks.
The totals in panel E help to illustrate how changes over time in the combat environment might bias our estimates. Injuries and fatalities increased to a local peak in month seven and declined thereafter until reaching a local trough in month 21. After month 21, casualties climbed steadily until reaching a global peak in month 38 and rapidly declined for the remaining months in the data. Supposing that the large ups and downs in casualty levels and the steep decline over the last few years are due to factors unrelated to the Army's vehicle fleet, it is necessary to control for these monthly changes in the combat environment to avoid bias in our estimates of the risk-reducing effects of Type 2 and Type 3 TWVs. TWVs, the striped gray areas to the slightly more protected Type 1 variant TWVs, the solid gray areas to Type 2 TWVs, and the black areas to Type 3 TWVs.
Descriptive Results for the SDC Units
The high variability in the vehicle numbers in Figure 2 is largely attributable to changes in the sample composition. The spike and later drop in infantry TWV quantities around month 29 is due to a drop from six to four in the number of units in the sample in month 28, a further drop to three units in month 29, and the addition of a different fourth unit in month 30. The spike in TWV quantities for the "other" category in the first few months of the sample is due to the number of units increasing from one to two from months 14 to 15 and again from three to four from months 17 to 18
The phase-in policies are both apparent in Figure 2 for all four unit types. The shift from Type 1 to Type 2 TWVs is soonest for infantry, with a sharp drop from an average of 123 Type 1
TWVs in month 17 to 19 Type 1 TWVs in the following month, and latest for administrative and support, who still had relatively large numbers of Type 1 TWVs around month 27. The Type 3
TWV phase-in is soonest and most pronounced for armored and cavalry, followed by infantry units. In their peak months, the average numbers of Type 3 TWVs were 62 for infantry, 59 for armored and cavalry, 18 for administrative and support, and 31 for other units.
Panels A through D of Figure 3 plot average casualties by unit type for the SDC data. As with panel E, casualties are highly variable across months, a phenomenon that is exacerbated by the changing sample composition in the SDC. Nevertheless, the general patterns from the theater-wide data also appear in Figure 3 ; we see lulls in casualties around month 22 followed by higher numbers in months 32 to 42 and few casualties in month 42 or later.
For infantry units in panel A, we see drops in casualties in month 18 (the month of the sharp phase-in of Type 2 TWVs) and in the month immediately afterward. This drop provides some very suggestive evidence of a negative effect of the Type 2 TWV phase-in for infantry units. For the remaining unit types, the Type 2 TWV phase-in occurred too slowly to disentangle its effects from gradual changes in the combat environment. The very low casualty rates observed in the months before the Type 3 TWV phase-in for infantry, administrative and support, and other units suggest that there is little that Type 3 TWVs could have done to further reduce casualties. For armored and cavalry units, the main increase in Type 3 TWVs occurred in month 46. While we see a drop to zero casualties in that month, casualties in the next three months were similar to the levels before the phase-in, and we do not see a long-term drop in casualties until month 50. The lack of a sharp and sustained decrease in casualties immediately after the Type 3 TWV phase-in provides some very suggestive evidence that there was not a large negative effect of the Type 3 TWV phase-in for armored and cavalry units.
IV. Model
Next, we develop an econometric framework for formally evaluating the costeffectiveness of the phase-in policies. For a given unit in month , suppose that fatalities are determined according to the following linear equation: Because the focus of this study is the effects of replacing one vehicle type with another, it is convenient to rearrange the terms in Equation (1) to obtain the following specification:
Equation (2) In order for OLS and fixed effects to consistently estimate these differences, we require that after controlling for unit-, location-, and time-specific determinants of fatalities as well as the total number ∑ 3 =1
of type one, two, and three vehicles, the unobserved determinants of fatalities are uncorrelated with unit 's time numbers 2 and 3 of Type 2 and Type 3
TWVs. The fraction of a unit's vehicles that appear in the sample varies across units in ways that are not observable to the researcher, and ∑ 3 =1
, 2 , and 3 are measured with error that is correlated with the factors determining this sampling fraction, among them units' activity levels and distance from the capital city. Because these fractions were roughly constant within units over time, we do not expect this bias to appear in our preferred specifications that include unit fixed effects in ,. The large changes in vehicle quantities generated by the phase-in policies help to ensure that, even after including many controls and fixed effects in the regressions, sufficient within-unit and within-province-by-month exogenous variation remains in 2 and 3 to identify � 2 − 1 � and � 3 − 1 �.
To relate these effects on fatalities to dollar costs, let 0 denote the purchase price (including shipping cost), and let 1 denote the additional cost per mile driven for a type vehicle. Let denote the miles driven of type vehicles by unit in month , and define as unit 's month expense for all three vehicle types::
.
Expenditures can be written as a linear function symmetrically to the fatalities equations:
where ( 2 − 1 ) and ( 3 − 1 ) represent the monthly costs of replacing a Type 1 TWV with a Type 2 or Type 3 TWV. Expressing the costs of changing vehicle type through Equation (4) helps to ensure that the same factors are held constant and the same sets of observations are compared to one another for the cost as for the fatalities estimation. The mileage and expenditure data are constructed from the SDC sample and use the same sampling weights as the vehicle counts; consequently, the measurement error in vehicle quantities that affects the fatalities regressions does not affect the coefficients in Equation (4).
The cost per life saved from replacing a Type 1 with a Type 2 TWV is The cost per life saved from replacing a Type 2 TWV with a Type 3 TWV is
, which is computed as negative one times the difference between the coefficient for Type 3 TWVs and the coefficient for Type 2 TWVs from Equation (4), all divided by the corresponding difference in coefficients from Equation (2). We calculate standard errors for these ratios by estimating Equations (2) and (4) together using seemingly unrelated regression and applying the delta method.
Other dependent variables considered in our analysis are combat-related injuries and miles driven of different vehicles. Measuring effects on injuries helps to identify a benefit of changing vehicle type not included in the cost per life saved calculations. In order to better interpret the effects on injuries, we compute ratios � 2 − 1 � � 2 − 1 � � and � 3 − 2 � � 3 − 2 � � of injuries reduced per life saved, where the superscript denotes coefficients from the injury equation. Measuring effects on the mileage variables help to determine the extent to which the replacement policies led units to alter their behavior.
V. Results
A. Effects of Vehicle Replacements on Fatalities
The four panels of Table 1 present OLS and fixed effects estimates of Equation (2) separately for each of the four unit types. All three vehicle quantities are divided by 100 so that the coefficients can be interpreted as the monthly reductions in fatalities generated by 100-unit changes in vehicles. Within each panel, each column corresponds to a different set of control variables included in the vector . In column (1), the controls include only a constant term.
Column (2) adds controls for other vehicle quantities and troop characteristics as well as a quadratic time effect. 13 Column (3) replaces the quadratic time effect with year by month fixed effects and adds province fixed effects. Column (4) replaces the year by month and province fixed effects with fixed effects for each province by year by month interaction. Column (5) replaces the province by year by month interactions with the quadratic time effect and adds unit fixed effects. Column (6) includes the year by month by province interactions and the unit fixed effects, and column (7) adds unit-specific monthly time trends. The standard errors adjust for clustering at the unit by year by quarter level.
In interpreting the results from ≈ 0.075 per month in order to be cost-effective. In order 13 The month and year combinations in the sample are numbered chronologically from one to 71, and both the number of the month-year combination and its square are included as regressors.
for replacing 100 Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs to be cost-effective, the coefficient on Type 3
TWVs would have to exceed that on Type 2 TWVs by $1.2 million $7.5 million ≈0.161.
In the specifications with no controls in column (1), we observe negative effects of Type 2 TWVs for all of the unit types except administrative and support. This coefficient is significantly different from zero in one of the four cases; the magnitude is at the costeffectiveness threshold for infantry units and does not meet this threshold for the other unit types.
We also observe negative effects of Type 3 TWVs for all four unit types that are significantly different from zero in two and marginally significant in one of the four cases. The fatalityreducing effects of Type 3 TWVs in column (1) the-envelope estimates provide very suggestive evidence that the Type 3 TWV would have been highly cost-effective had it been introduced during a more intense period of the war.
Next, Table 3 presents cost per life saved estimates in which the sample is restricted to specific geographic areas and units. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is restricted to units located in the province of the capital city. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to units located in other provinces (including province unknown). In columns (5) and (6), the sample in each panel is restricted to units whose average miles driven per vehicle per month exceed the median for that unit type; the samples in columns (7) and (8) include units whose average miles driven per vehicle per month fall below these medians. The specifications in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) control for other vehicle quantities, troop characteristics, and province by year by month fixed effects, as in column (4) of Tables 1 and 2 . The specifications in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) add unit fixed effects, as in column (6) of Tables 1 and 2 .
Because units from the capital city and particularly active units were oversampled, the costs per life saved are likely to be overstated in columns (1), (2), (7), and (8) and understated in columns (3), (4), (5), and (6). Few of the cost per life saved estimates in Table 3 are on the borderline of cost-effectiveness, and adjusting for moderately-sized differences in the fraction of vehicles sampled per unit would not affect any of our cost-effectiveness determinations.
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The estimates from Table 3 indicate that replacing Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs was not cost-effective in any of the cases considered, with nine cases of costs per life saved that exceed the cost-effectiveness threshold, two cases in which the cost per life saved falls below the threshold but Type 1 TWVs are the most cost-effective option, 19 cases in which the policy is 16 For an undersampled unit, a single TWV in the sample might represent four vehicles, while a single TWV in an oversampled unit's sample might represent only two vehicles. Using a weight of three for both unit types will bias our fatality coefficients and lead us in this example to overstate the undersampled unit's costs per life saved and understate the oversampled unit's costs per life saved by factors of 3 2 ⁄ and 3 4 ⁄ , respectively.
found to have increased fatalities, and two cases in which no fatalities were observed (and the policy consequently had no effect on fatalities).
We find that the policy of replacing Type 1 with Type 2 TWVs was cost-effective for infantry and "other" units in the relatively dangerous area of the capital city province, with estimates ranging from $0.65 million to $11.2 million, below the cost-effectiveness threshold in three and just above the threshold in one of four cases. As in Table 2 , the cost per life saved is lower in the specifications that include unit fixed effects. For infantry units, we find evidence that the policy may have been cost effective in other provinces as well, with a large cost per life saved of $27.8 million in the specification without unit fixed effects but a low cost per life saved of $0.51 million in the preferred specification that includes unit fixed effects. We find that the policy was not cost-effective for "other" unit types outside of the capital city province. For particularly active infantry and "other" unit types in columns (5) and (6), the specifications without unit fixed effects indicate that the policy was not cost-effective, but the preferred specifications with unit fixed effects show costs per life saved well below the cost-effectiveness threshold, at $1.3 million and $1.9 million. For less active infantry and "other" units, we find that the policy was not cost-effective. For armored and cavalry units, we find that the policy of replacing Type 1 with Type 2 TWVs fails the cost-benefit test in seven of eight cases considered here but may have been cost-effective in provinces other than the capital city province. For administrative and support units, we find that the policy fails the cost-benefit test in six of eight cases and in all four of the preferred specifications that include unit fixed effects.
C. Injury Reductions per Life Saved
Next, in 
VI. Conclusion
This study uses FOUO data from various sources to determine the cost per life saved through the U.S. Army's large-scale policies to replace Type 1 with Type 2 TWVs and later to replace Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs. After controlling for unit-specific factors and province by year by month effects, we find that the shift from Type 1 to Type 2 TWVs was cost-effective for infantry units and for "other" unit types including artillery, engineers, military police, and ordnance. The majority of the reductions in fatalities were concentrated among vehicles with high levels of activity (as measured by miles driven per vehicle month) and in the capital city province, the most combat-intensive area. For the less active infantry and "other" units and for "other" unit types in other provinces, the switch to Type 2 TWVs does not appear to have been cost-effective. For armored and cavalry units and administrative and support units, we find that the switch from Type 1 to Type 2 TWVs did not reduce fatalities and in general was also not cost-effective. We find that Type 3 TWVs did not generate large reductions in fatalities beyond those achieved by the Type 2 TWVs and were not cost-effective for any unit type. Table 1 : Within each panel, each column shows results from a separate OLS or fixed effects regression. The samples in panels A to D correspond to the unit types shown in columns (1) to (4) of Table A1 . Standard errors adjust for clustering by unit x year x quarter interactions. The control variables included in the regressions vary across columns and are listed at the bottom of the table. "Other vehicles" controls include five variables for the numbers of different types of tactical and non-tactical vehicles other than TWVs, including tracked vehicles and trucks. Unit characteristics include the variables listed in rows 22 to 32 of Table A1 . Province fixed effects include 19 categories, one of which is "unknown." Additional details in the text. Table 2 : Within each panel, each column shows estimates of the cost per life saved from replacing a Type 2 with a Type 3 TWV and the cost per life saved from replacing a Type 1 with a Type 2 TWV. These costs per life saved are estimated using the results from two sets of regressions. The first set of regressions estimates the effects of Type 3 and Type 2 TWVs on total TWV -related expenditure; the specifications for these regressions are the same as in Table 1 but with expenditure rather than deaths used as the dependent variable. The second set of regressions estimates the effects of Type 3 and Type 2 TWVs on deaths; these estimates are shown in Table 1 . The cost per life saved for Type 2 in place of Type 1 TWVs is calculated as the coefficient on Type 2 TWVs in the expenditure equation divided by the corresponding coefficient in the fatalities equation, all multiplied by negative one. The cost per life saved for Type 3 in place of Type 2 TWVs is calculated as the coefficient on Type 3 minus the coefficient on Type 2 TWVs in the expenditure equation, all divided by the corresponding difference in the fatalities equation and multiplied by negative one. The control variables used in these equations are the same as shown in Table 1 and are also summarized at the bottom of this table. The standard errors are computed using the delta method (nlcom in Stata) with the cross-equation covariances in the coefficients estimated through seemingly-unrelated regression (suest in Stata). These standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the unit x year x quarter level. Additional details in the text. Table 2 ; however, four different subsamples of the data are considered here to measure how the effects vary across provinces and over time. The control variables in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are the same as in column (4) of Tables 1 and 2 , and the control variables in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) are the same as in column (6) of Tables 1 and 2 . The sample in columns (5) and (6) is restricted to the period from months one to forty-two, before, during, and after Type 2 TWVs were phased in but before Type 3 TWVs were introduced to U.S. Army units. The sample in columns (7) and (8) is restricted to the period from months 37 to 71, after Type 1 TWVs had been phased out and before, during, and after Type 3 TWVs were phased in. Additional details in the text. Table 4 : Within each panel, each column shows estimates of the reduction in injuries that occurs per life saved from replacing a Type 2 with a Type 3 TWV and the cost per life saved from replacing a Type 1 with a Type 2 TWV. This ratio provides a measure of one benefit of Type 3 and Type 2 TWVs that units experienced in addition to the reductions in fatalities. The reduction in injuries per life saved is computed in the same way as the cost per life saved, except that total TWV-related expenditure is replaced with unit-level injuries as the dependent variable for the first equation, and the ratios of effects are not multiplied by negative one. Additional details in the text.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive characteristics for our main sample are shown separately for each of the four types of units in the four columns of Table A1 . Rows one to three present means and standard errors for the casualty variables, rows four through 11 show the miles driven variables and rows 12 through 19 show the vehicle quantity variables from the SDC data. Row twenty shows a dummy variable for whether the unit was in the capital city province, the province in which 69% of the sample's casualties occurred, and row 21shows a dummy variable for whether the unit's province is classified as unknown. Rows 22 to 32 show sample means for the other unit characteristics.
As the first three rows of Table A1 show, infantry and armored and cavalry units experienced four to six times more casualties in a given month than did administrative and support or "other" units. Adding across rows four to 11, vehicle usage was similar across the four unit types, ranging from 40,300 miles driven per month for administrative and support units to 59,900 miles per month for infantry and armored and cavalry units. Armored and cavalry units tended to have more vehicles than other units; adding across rows 12 to 19, infantry, administrative and support, and other units had 103.2, 72.5, and 89.2 vehicles in a typical month, while armored and cavalry units had 279.2. Armored and cavalry units had the most TWVs and tracked vehicles than other unit types, "other" units and infantry units had the most other armored vehicles (a category that includes personnel carriers and route clearance vehicles), and administrative and support units had the most other unarmored vehicles.
As the next two rows show, the more heavily equipped and combat active unit types were most likely to be located in the capital city province, with 59.6% of armored and cavalry observations and 42.7% of infantry observations being located there, as compared to 27.4% and 34.6% for administrative and support and other unit types. As might be expected, the units that were engaged in combat less are most likely to have province values of "Unknown."
Administrative and support and other unit types have unknown locations in 30% of the cases, while infantry and armored and cavalry units both have unknown locations in 16% of cases.
From the unit characteristics variables in rows 22 to 32, we see that armored and cavalry units and infantry units had more personnel, at 635 and 595, as compared to 308 and 260 for administrative and support and other unit types. Troops in administrative and support units tended to be slightly older than personnel in other unit types, and they were more likely to be female and black. Troops in armored and cavalry divisions were less likely than troops in other division types to be privates or PFCs, and the units' home bases in the U.S. were more concentrated in the South and less in the West as compared to other unit types. Troops in other unit types were least likely to be officers, high school graduates, or minorities.
B. Effects of Vehicle Replacements on Miles Driven
From the perspective of a military planner making large-scale decisions, the ideal measures of cost-effectiveness take into account that vehicle replacement policies will change vehicle usage and estimate the observed changes in deaths given that such changes in usage occurred. It is not desirable in estimating the cost-effectiveness of the Type 2 and Type 3 TWVs to attempt to hold usage constant, and the true cost-effectiveness of the policies depends upon both the intrinsic properties of the vehicles and behavioral responses throughout the chain of command. Nevertheless, examining the vehicle replacement policies' effects on vehicle usage can help to explain some of the unusual findings from Table 1.
The regressions in Table A2 have similar specifications as in Table 1 , except that the dependent variables are changed from fatalities to miles driven. Due to the larger magnitudes, the regressors are not divided by 100 for this table. As in the previous table, the four panels correspond to the four unit types. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is miles driven that month in TWVs. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is miles driven in tracked vehicles. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is miles driven in other armored vehicles. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is miles driven in unarmored vehicles other than TWVs. The sets of controls are the same as in Table 3 .
Across the entire sample, the average TWV is driven 467.4 miles in a month, the average Abrams or Bradley is driven 151.7 miles, the average other armored vehicle is driven 185.7 miles , and the average other unarmored vehicle is driven 521.5 miles. Relative to these magnitudes, many of the results from Table A2 are imprecise and variable across specifications.
For infantry units, many of our estimated coefficients change signs when fixed effects are added, and we do not observe strong and consistent effects of the vehicle replacements on usage of any of the vehicle types. For armored and cavalry units, in three out of four cases, we find fairly large negative effects of the vehicle replacement policies on the miles driven of tracked vehicles.
For the Type 3 TWV policy, we also find moderately-sized negative effects on TWV miles and moderately-sized positive effects on miles driven of other unarmored vehicles. This shift away from tracked vehicles and toward unarmored vehicles may help to explain why we observe positive effects of the replacement policies on fatalities for this unit type. For administrative and support units, we also observe fairly large negative effects of the Type 3 TWV policy on TWV miles driven; however, the effects on vehicle usage in the specifications with fixed effects are not large and do not offer a ready explanation for the positive effects that we find of both replacement policies on fatalities for that unit type. For the other unit category, we observe large positive effects of both replacement policies on TWV miles; hence, providing these units with more heavily protected vehicles led them to shift toward more intensive usage of those vehicles. Table A1 : Sample means presented with their standard errors in parentheses. Unit casualty and characteristics data were obtained from requests to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Only a sample of vehicles is observed for every unit. Vehicle mileages and counts are estimates based on the mileages and numbers of vehicles that appear in the sample. The fraction of a unit's vehicles that appear in the dataset varied across units based on the difficulty of obtaining data from that unit (Horsley, 2010); however, this fraction does not appear to have varied within units over time. We estimate vehicle counts and mileages using a separate, constant adjustment factor for each vehicle type, as described in the text. Each unit's province is computed as the province in which the most casualties occurred that month. For units with no casualties with known locations, the province is taken from the nearest month in which province is known. If the province is not known for any month, then the province is categorized as unknown. "Average days of deployment" measures the average of deployment experience in the Global War on Terror (including Theaters A and B) among troops in that unit. Vehicle quantities and usage data come from the Theater A SDC dataset from AMSAA. Infantry includes all units whose names include the words or phrases "airborne" (i.e., paratrooper), "anti-armor," "combat," "infantry," "rifle," or "special forces," or abbreviations thereof, but excluding "combat support." Armored and cavalry include all units whose names include the words or phrases "armored" or "cavalry" or abbreviations thereof and are not infantry units. Administrative and support include all units whose names include "Army Materiel Command," "aviation," "chemical," "finance," "headquarters," "intelligence," "maintenance," "medical," "personnel," "post office," "recce" (i.e., reconnaissance), "signal" (i.e., communications), "support," "surveillance," "transportation," or abbreviations thereof and are not infantry, armored, or cavalry units. Units whose names could not be identified were placed in this category. Other units include those not falling into the previous three categories and include artillery, engineers, military police, and ordnance. Additional details in the text. Table 3 . No regressions are shown for tracked vehicle mileage for administrative and support units because none of those units had any tracked vehicles over the sample period. Additional details in the text.
